



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

worthy are: the deduction of the categories, the discussion of the logical origin of the contrast between the "world of description" and the "world of appreciation" and the illustration of these two points of view by the mathematical doctrine of the two forms of serial order, and the whole section on the philosophy of nature.

Where so much is given perhaps it is hardly fair that more should be required, but I regret that our author did not find time to bring into sharper contrast with his own doctrine the views which it most closely resembles, as for example the views of Hegel and Fichte and Plato. Very considerable portions of the work might be read as a commentary on Plato's idea of the good as the object of knowledge. We might well place historically one important phase of this view by saying that Professor Royce has read his Fichte with the eyes of Plato, and his Plato with the eyes of Fichte, and then recast the result in the light of recent mathematical discussions of the concept of the infinite.

The author's answer to all such doubts as we have been raising has been given in advance: They "are founded upon a failure to grasp our doctrine of Being in its wholeness," they arise from "persistently dwelling now too exclusively upon this and now too abstractly upon that aspect of our theory, and neglecting to regard the meaning of all its aspects together" (II., p. 337). I am not sure that the answer would not be fair. One must have a large thought-span, must be, in short, in our author's sense, a godlike person to be able to hold before his consciousness *totum simul* all the phases of this subtle and intricate philosophy.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT FROM THALES TO KANT. By Ludwig Noiré. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. 359.

It may be doubted whether it was advisable to reissue Mr. Noiré's introduction to Prof. Max Müller's translation of Kant's "Kritik" as an independent work. In the first place, neither philosophy nor the history of philosophy has stood still during the twenty years since 1881, and Mr. Noiré's book is, by an inevitable consequence, in many points already antiquated.

His account of Greek thought before Socrates, in particular, would need to be entirely re-written to bring it into accord with the new light that has been thrown on the subject by such writers as Zeller, Diels, Baünker, and Burnet since its first publication. Nor are the late John Stuart Mill and G. H. Lewes precisely typical of "the whole English philosophy of the present day" (p. 109) now, whatever may have been the case two decades ago. But there is a more important objection to the appearance of the book as an independent history of philosophic thought, the unnatural and strained character of its principal thesis. The author's avowed object is to exhibit the whole course of speculation from the earliest dawn of the Milesian physics as an imperfect attempt to formulate the truth as it is in Kant, and to present that truth as the final answer to all philosophic questions. Now this kind of hero-worship is more or less expected in an Introduction to a translation of the "Kritik;" we allow for its presence and it does no particular harm. But in an independent history of philosophy we have a right to complain of it as a fatal source of distortions of perspective. It is always dangerous to interpret the thought of the past in the light of a particular philosophic system, and in the case of the Kantian system the danger is exceptionally great. There is some excuse perhaps for the error in dealing with modern philosophy, for Kant avowedly constructed his doctrine for the express purpose of solving the problems which had been raised by Descartes and Locke. But like Spinoza before him he constantly shows himself ill-informed about the thought of the ancients and unhappy in his occasional references to them. Thus the *a priori* probability that the key to Plato and Aristotle will be found in a system constructed in indifference to their work and under quite other influences is exceeding slight. Nor does history give much support to the view that Kant's severance of the unknowable world of realities from the knowable but unreal world of appearances is the last word of human reason upon its own problems. If it is true that wherever Kant's influence has penetrated it has proved the most potent incentive to philosophic thought, it is surely no less true—and it is perhaps Kant's chief title to a central position among modern philosophers—that nowhere has philosophic thought been content to rest within the limits Kant would fain have prescribed. Hegel, Herbart, Fries, Schopenhauer, Green, Bradley, they are all in a sense Kant's spiritual children, but the thought of each of them is

essentially an endeavor by one line or another to penetrate once more to that world of *δντα* which Kant and Mr. Noiré regard as hopelessly unknowable. And if we try to discern the movements of contemporary thought outside the strict limits of the schools from current literature, we seem led to the same result. The "systems" of antiquity may, as Mr. Noiré says, have "passed away for ever" (p. 111) as systems, but the thought of Plato and Aristotle and Plotinus—to say nothing of the great "dogmatists" of the seventeenth century—is with us still, and to all appearance is likely to remain so. If ever prophecy was ever falsified by history, Kant's anticipation that the system of criticism would forever supersede previous thought has been so.

With his worship of Kant Mr. Noiré conjoins a curious belief that the true basis of philosophy must be sought in the history of language (p. 2 ff.). The rapidity with which one philological system after another has first reigned supreme and then been ignominiously dethroned even in the space of the last half-century scarcely augurs well for the stability of a philosophy built on such shifting foundations, nor does the apparently complete supersession of the philologist by the anthropologist as the one authorized interpreter of the mind of "primitive man" tend to restore our shaken confidence. What is more vital still, the proposal to detect the *a priori* elements in human thought by an appeal to the history of language appears to involve a confusion between psychological priority and epistemological a-priority against which, one may conjecture, Kant would have protested no less vigorously than Prof. Münsterberg.*

To descend to some points of detail. Mr. Noiré's determination to read the Kantian theory of cognition into all previous philosophy compels him—at the cost of historical accuracy—to find the antithesis of sensation and thought everywhere. Parmenides (p. 10) by a time-honored "howler" is made to assert the identity of thought and being, and to distinguish between sensation and thinking, in spite of the positive and emphatic testimony of Theophrastus that he made no difference between *φρονεῖν* and *αἰσθάνεσθαι*. Heracleitus is equally misrepresented (p. 12) when his saying that "eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men whose souls do not understand their language," is distorted into the view that the "eyes and ears are liars." By a still bolder misrepresentation his

*See "Grundzüge der Psychologie," I, 163.

naïvely materialistic explanation of the comparative irrationality of dreams is tortured (pp. 12, 13) into a presentiment that knowledge is "constituted by two factors." Of "all the philosophers of antiquity" it is roundly asserted that they made it their principal business "to distinguish between phenomena and noumena" (p. 25), and the statement is expressly applied to Heracleitus, one of those pre-Socratics of whom Aristotle tells us not once nor twice that τὰ ὄντα ἐπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον. Plato and Aristotle fare rather better, though the former in particular suffers more than once from the author's weakness for inaccurate citation. Thus (pp. 44, 45) he is charged with ascribing "the perceptions of sense directly to the organs," though Mr. Noiré on the very next page gives a reference to the passage ("Theaetetus," 184) where Plato, for the first time in the history of philosophy, makes the very distinction between the agent and the organ of perception on which Mr. Noiré is insisting. It is difficult to be sure of the author's interpretation of the doctrine of Ideas. He repeatedly insists, correctly enough, upon the objective character of all ancient philosophy, yet (pp. 48, 97) he elsewhere uses language about the *ιδέαι* which involves the double error of ascribing to Plato the psychological interpretation of *ιδέα* and *εἶδος* as "ideas in the mind," and of further failing to distinguish, within the limits of the subjective interpretation, the "idea" in Locke's sense (the immediate *object* of the mind) and the "idea" as a "mental image." His account of Aristotle once more is rendered almost unintelligible by inaccurate interpretation in the light of various subsequent systems. Thus (p. 52) Aristotle's ultimate "mover" is actually identified with "mechanical natural force," an interpretation which suggests that Mr. Noiré has forgotten the *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρῶμενον* of "Metaphysics" A; on p. 63 the stoic doctrine of the world-soul and a theory of the innate creative activity of matter* like that of Bruno are read into Aristotle, though both doctrines are in flagrant contradiction with the genuine Peripatetic theory of the "first mover," which is correctly given two pages further on. The laudation of Aristotle as an empiricist

* There appears to be here some confusion in the writer's mind between *βλῆ* and *φύσις*. It is true that to Aristotle *φύσις* is *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ*; but it is precisely because of their relation to a supreme "first mover" who is pure form without matter that things have such an internal *ρχή*. ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς ἡρτῆται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.

(p. 52) seems to ignore the fact that empiricism is a method and not a dogma, and that an inductive method was *not* the ideal of the author of the "Posterior Analytics." For these and similar reasons I find it hard to admit that Plato and Aristotle have been proved by the author to be only "in the outer court of metaphysics." Perhaps they are in that unsatisfactory position, but at least Mr. Noiré is in the outer courts of Platonic and Aristotelian exegesis.

Space forbids me to say much of the section on "Mediæval Philosophy." I cannot, however, help calling attention to the profound misunderstanding involved in the treatment of Plotinus and Porphyry along with the mediæval schoolmen instead of in their true place as continuers of the classical thought of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. It is to be hoped that the recent excellent work of Mr. Whittaker on the Neoplatonists will make this historical mistake rarer in the future than it has been in the past. The two doctrines quoted by Mr. Noiré from Plotinus, by the way, as instances of the gulf between Neoplatonism and classical antiquity (p. 77) tell the other way. That the "place of the world" is the soul" is the doctrine of the *Timeus* (see especially 36 E) and that time has no existence apart from the soul is a simple inference from the Platonic propositions that time is regular and equable succession and that the soul is the only source of movement. The author's illustrations of the growth in mediæval thought of the interest in the subjective psychology of conception are striking and suggestive, but it is hard to find any justification for his quaint theory that Christian monotheism is pantheistic in spirit whereas ancient thought, because polytheistic, is essentially pluralist. Whatever the "plain men" of ancient Hellas may have thought, it is pretty clear that to Anaximander or Heracleitus the existence of "gods" did *not* mean the interference of conflicting personalities with the course of nature.*

With the philosophers of modern times Mr. Noiré is much more at home and rightly devotes the major part of his sketch to them. In the main his account, if inevitably one-sided, as any treatment which regards the whole course of modern speculation as a preparation for the Critical Philosophy is bound to be, is a careful and often acute analysis of the Kantian elements in pre-Kantian

* And what of the Stoic *εἰμαρμένῃ* or of the Epicurean worlds which run their course "*opera sine dirom*"?

thought. Thus he rightly insists on the subjective character once for all impressed on modern philosophy at its inception by the Cartesian *cogito* as a prophecy of the Kantian reduction of ontology to epistemology. What one desiderates both in his examination of Descartes and his very sympathetic account of Spinoza is a clearer perception of the difficulties created for both philosophers by their purely mechanical conception of the physical world. Mr. Noiré sees the immense value of the mechanical conception of nature for the purposes of mathematical investigation into physical processes; he does not see quite so clearly the fundamental contradiction between mechanism as a philosophical theory of nature and a spiritual philosophy of mind. Thus he explicitly lauds Descartes (p. 141) for admitting that mind can alter the direction though not the quantity of motion; an admission which really involves the complete renunciation of the mechanical hypothesis. This failure to see that *direction* and "quantity of motion" are inseparable, taken along with the curious passage on the next page (142) where body is explained, after Kant, to mean "space filled with force," suggests that the author's own ideas upon the nature of physical concepts stand in need of some clarification. Similarly in the account of Spinoza, though the writer correctly calls attention to the extreme difficulty of reconciling Spinoza's parallelism with the existence of individual things, he accepts the two-attribute doctrine itself without misgiving, failing to see that the whole question is whether "parallelism" itself is not a self-contradictory concept. He does not distinguish, any more than Spinoza himself, between the *fact* of at least approximate concomitance between a mental and a physical series and the metaphysical *hypothesis* of parallelism which Spinoza offers as the explanation of the fact.* A deeper misunderstanding is betrayed by the criticism that human thought, being "only an ephemeral *modus* of the infinite substance," cannot conceive that substance *sub specie æternitatis*. The objection only holds from the standpoint of Kantian Phenomenalism, and Spinoza was no phenomenalist, nor was the human mind to him an "ephemeral" but an *eternal* *modus cogitandi*. Mr. Noiré's chapter on Locke, remarkable in its way as a successful compression of the long and often confused argument of the "Essay" into a few pages, suffers,

* Cf. the rhetorical language on p. 225, where a loose statement of the problem itself is confidently offered as its solution.

as does Locke's book itself, from the failure to distinguish historical research into the origin of concepts from metaphysical criticism of their validity. Hence Locke's theory of knowledge, as set forth in his fourth book, comes off without any really serious critical examination. With Leibnitz the author deals sympathetically and more than once vindicates him successfully from the unjust aspersions of Schopenhauer. It is however a serious mistake to censure the "Harmony" as a mere dogmatic excrescence on Leibnitz's thought (p. 268). Whatever we may think of the theory as a piece of metaphysics it is an inevitable consequence of Leibnitz's fundamental assumptions. Leibnitz had convinced himself that there is a plurality of real substances, and that every substance is the ground of its own states. The first of these assumptions excludes the parallelism hypothesis, the second the doctrine of an *influxus physicus*. Thus there was only one way in which Leibnitz could avoid pronouncing the existence of a world-order a standing miracle, and that was the way he adopted. Again, Mr. Noiré is right in asserting against Schopenhauer the solid value of the Leibnitian principle of sufficient reason, but he fails to see that what gives it its value is its teleological character. In the form in which he criticizes it it is, what Schopenhauer called it, a piece of empty tautology. Mr. Noiré is less happy in his criticism of the Leibnitian physics. Like others before him, he is enthusiastic about the introduction of the concept of "force" into physics; like others also he fails to give any precise definition to this unhappy and ambiguous term. I confess that I do not know how to reconcile his approval of Leibnitz's criticism of the Cartesian "conservation of motion" with his assertion that Descartes' distinction between quantity and direction of motion is "the true solution" (p. 308) of the autonomy of liberty and necessity. The treatment of Hume, with which the book ends, follows strictly conventional lines, and is almost exclusively confined to the problem of Causation. All citations are made from the "Enquiry" and the author appears to be unacquainted with the far-reaching investigations of the "Treatise" into the question of personal identity.

A. E. TAYLOR.

OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.